Bradley Perrett | Defence Strategic Review doesn't go far enough, air force omitted

The review's main published recommendations for reorienting the armed forces apply to the army and navy. Rapid expansion of the air force, the action that would make the most difference to national security this decade, is entirely omitted.

Perhaps the single greatest step in the review is to kill off an Australian defence principle called Balanced Force. Under that pernicious, decades-old notion, our armed services have not had to concentrate on any particular war scenario.

The review's replacement is Focused Force, and the mission is clear: to fight hostile forces (meaning Chinese ones in the event of war) that try to come close to Australia.

But if denying access to nearby areas is the priority, where are recommendations for expanding the air force? That's the service that can do most to ensure Chinese ships and aircraft cannot approach us, and it's the one whose capability can be ramped up fastest.

In the review's published version, at least, new air force policies don't go much further than equipping fighters with new strike missiles. Fine, but how about buying more fighters, plus additional tankers and air-surveillance and maritime aircraft?

As expected, the review includes toughening northern bases, notably air bases. It has also adopted the excellent idea of using civilian airfields up north for dispersing military aircraft to reduce their vulnerability.

Building more and smaller warships, a policy that was expected from the review, is also in there. A decision on how many to build is due within five months.

And spending on the army will be redirected, as it absolutely must be redirected, away from the generals' blinkered obsession with intense ground combat, which is simply not what we need to prepare for just now. The cuts don't go far enough, however.

Most usefully, we will acquire more ground-launched strike missiles, especially US PrSM weapons that the army could use against ships. That's a central part of the strategy for warding off China.

The army will also have better systems for shooting down missiles and aircraft.

Then there's the bit that looks really questionable. We are supposed to get "a fully enabled, integrated amphibious-capable combined-arms land system". Interpretation: in a war, part of the army is supposed to sail on ships to foreign islands and fight land battles on them or at least set up its missile systems there.

Forward-deployed missile systems would certainly be handy for deterring approaches to this continent. But the amphibious force, including thousands of soldiers, could end up on the seabed before it gets to an island. Ships are becoming increasingly detectable and, if approaching an enemy, are often easy to attack. It's easy to imagine volleys of Chinese anti-ship missiles sinking such a fleet.

The same threat applies to the proposed small warships, which would be cheaper than frigates or destroyers but correspondingly weak in defending themselves.

We should fear that by building more but smaller surface warships we would only be giving China the task of using a few more anti-ship missiles to sink our fleet.

It all depends on estimates of whether such vessels can cope with attack. Navies tend to think warships are survivable - but they would, wouldn't they? Experts outside of navies are not so sure.

As for the most survivable and powerful type of warship, the review says: "The acquisition of a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability in the shortest possible timeframe should be prioritised ...."

Read it again, Prime Minister: "in the shortest possible timeframe".

READ MORE:

There's a hint in the review that expansion of the air force is planned but not yet announced. The service needs "a scalable aircrew training system", it says. That suggests it needs to be ready to scale up.

The review rejects the idea of buying Northrop Grumman B-21 Raiders, stealth bombers that are not yet in service with the US Air Force. Reasons are not given, but the poor economics of running a small fleet of enormously costly aircraft would be the big one. It's probably cheaper just to buy more strike missiles, such as PrSMs.

Buying more missiles is one of the few moves the review recommends be done in the shortest timeframe it contemplates - 2023-2025. Other urgent policies are the hardening of the northern bases and of command and communications systems. The review also hopes for acceleration of some projects that are already under way.

One that will be sped up is the fielding of systems for shooting down aircraft and, most difficult to hit, strike missiles. Such enemy weapons could disable our bases, command posts, defence factories and even civilian infrastructure, such as bridges.

China has a huge stock of strike missiles - ballistic ones, which fly up into space then fall rapidly on targets, and cruise missiles, which fly like aeroplanes and are usually launched by bombers or submarines.

"Defence must deliver a layered integrated air and missile defence operational capability urgently," the review says, criticising the current project to design and build an excellent system that wouldn't come into service for many years.

Instead, according to the review, we should just look at what we can buy off the shelf. Although good Israeli systems are available, the odds are that the government will soon order missile batteries, radars and command systems from US suppliers.

This review brings progress to Australian defence policy, but the army is not changing enough and, nuclear submarines aside, the navy may not be changing for the better. The air force, so far as we can tell, will hardly be changing at all.